"Cum ipsi (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum earn vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum earn vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos veile ex motu corporis aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et snitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejiciendis, fugiendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enuntiabam."

(Augustine, Confessions, 1. 8.)

This extract alone made me rethink what exactly shapes the essence of human language — due to the fact it is missing an important part, a vital one. Because also when one says "Every word in language signifies something" they have so far said nothing whatsoever. For it is even more important to explain exactly what distinction we wish to make. I cannot pretend to know the answer now, as it is an ongoing quest, for personal understanding.

I believe the number of "primitive propositions of logic" to be totally arbitrary. I disagree fundamentally with the idea that some propositions are essentially primitive while others are not (logical product of Frege's primitive propositions). For all of them are equal in rank, and you can use any of them to deduce the rest— they follow from one another and are interchangeable. Frege would argue it means they are no longer immediately self-evident, but it is remarkable a thinker like him had to appeal to the degree of self-evidence as a criterion.

On the other hand, the number of necessary fundamental operations in Logic only depends on the chosen notation. The logical system must be constructed based on signs of a definite number of dimensions, and of a definite mathematical multiplicity. I agree with Hertz when he says that: Only uniform connexions are "thinkable", and I think it is the foundation on which all is made.

It might be obvious that the structure of logic is shown through tautologies, which demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them into ones that say nothing (unconditionally true). And although in a sense that makes them meaningless, because they stand in no relation to reality— they provide the foundation by which we can assess the formal logical structure on a base level.

It follows from this same reasoning that contradictions would play the same role on the opposite side of the coin, by demarcating the boundaries that delimit the logical space. Also, possibility of denial is already prejudged in the affirmation itself, and each proposition contains within itself the result of all truth-operations that can be applied on it, including but not limited to negation, which in turn renders them all equally self-evident in my opinion.

I still think I am possibly missing something, perhaps the fact that this implies logic is indifferent to empirical truth. That appears to be true, as we use logic to infer from propositions which do not belong to mathematics to others which equally do not belong. Such propositions can neither be proven nor disproven by empirical experience, highlighting an unbridgeable epistemological gap. For logic is a priori; it precedes all experience— it is simply something that is so.

Currently thinking of the truth aptitude of assertoric utterances of religious discourse, specifically when it comes to reference appropriate to truth, descriptiveness and other realism-relevant concepts, and on this topic, I can argue that truth can be understood as an idealised rational acceptability.

"To claim something is True is to claim it could be Justified." But then the question comes if truth can truly be independent of all justification, and of the standards of reference — which I believe to have no essence — because there is not some one thing which can be called referring, but only overlapping similarities between one sort of referring and the next as best as I can see.

The way to understand should not then be applying some metaphysical classification of possible forms of discourse, and I don't subscribe to the non-doxastic theories usually presented as psychological or epistemological theories about the nature of faith either. The implications of my position have yet to be fully set out.

Intensification of intuition naturally results in an extraordinary aloofness of the individual from tangible reality, for possessing judgment only under the spell of the "how" of perception tends to fail to meets the question fundamentally, and as an intuitive person, this hits on my weakness.

I feel as if I have an archaic understanding of the sensory world, compared to very clear vast mental wanderings. Looking for purpose but feeling blind, the eternal paradox.

We are mistaken as to the degree to which we believe ourselves hated or liked: we may know very well the degree to which we differ from a person, a tendency, or a party, but others know us only very superficially and therefore hate us only superficially.